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Making the infantry of Arashi

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HamsterIV:
The Desert Asp story was a fun read but I see adventure mode consisting of two types of people: People in flying contraptions and people who have stuff dropped on them by people in flying contraptions. So long as I am part of the former, I could care less about the back stories and motivations of the latter.

Sgt. Spoon:
I actually find the whole ground aspect very intriguing

Lord Dick Tim:
Well :P to you Hamster!

Ok, as for the Arashi formations, this is a fluid concept and the story was just to establish some kind of direction, not necessarily the correct one.

When I think of any force that has to fight both the Mercantile Guild and the Yesha Empire I conjure up the image of a people very accustomed to fighting war on their home front.  Their scavenger like cities and militaries might hold on to weapons, design templates for centuries, while also looting enemy equipment and tactics.

This could change wildly from one city to the next, each on adapting tactics or equipment from their corners of the Arashi desert.

Lord Dick Tim:
Ok, taking a look at some historical battles I came across several notable examples of mixed military campiegns using various degrees of technological advancements and fighting ethos welded into a single military force.
It's not pretty.

The most recognizable ancient figure was Hannibal, historians don't agree on every detail but it appeared to be a repeated act that people's with less armor, or perceived inferior technology, would loot enemy dead and use their armor and weapons.  Apparently many of his mercenary foot divisions used looted roman armor and weapons.  (this is widely debated on precisely what was used for more reasons then I care to go into)

The same occurs in the American Revoluton, capturing British uniforms and changing the colors to blue from red.  Using English muskets and cannons, as well as ships for the continental army and navy.

With Arashi I can see this being much the same, during a war, but not likely at the beginning of one.  I'd reason that northern Arashi soldiers would have more Yesha equipment and adapted to fighting with it, where eastern cities would naturally appear more like Merchantile armies.

Most of these mixed unit armies usually only pick up victories because the enemy under estimates their resolve and under estimates the amount of enemies they actually have and the commitment of their allies.  (when Hannibal crushed the roman legions at cannae almost all southern Italy declared for Carthage)

So maybe at the battalion level, we'd see cohesion, but at a regimental level we would see various different types of units all mashed together, each battalion varying in composition and refinement.

Charon:
I think your breakdown is pretty solid so far, Tim.

I have to cite some examples, so I guess I'll start from my own experience. 

Any fighting group, nomadic or static, modern or ancient, advanced or otherwise will have some sort of organization. This is even true of the insurgency in Iraq, and the Taliban in Afghanistan. Hell, it's especially true, I should say. We don't give these types near enough credit. In any cell worth its salt, there will be a leadership element, a financial element, a logistics or procurement element, a ground warfare element and an instruction element. There may be more, but there are rarely less.

These groups are organized in different ways, but the most effective ones appear to adhere in some small way to large-scale military orgnization. There are brigades, battalions, companies, platoons and even fireteams. Are they always so well organized? No, but with good reason. In any unconventional unit, leadership must be decentralized. Groups on the ground need to be capable of carrying out operations with a bare minimum of guidance from higher (We do this too, but we do it a bit better). So, there will be a chain of command that gives broad statements about operations to be carried out in a region, with smaller, more local (and usually embedded) figureheads to carry them out. These figureheads are usually prominent figures already well established in the society, believe it or not. This method works well when it's your homeland that's been invaded.

For an expeditionary group, a group going to other places to conduct operations, there is a bit more control. The model mentioned above would simply not work in the same way. Why would a group of roughneck, cut-throat types know that this would work?

Fight any enemy for long enough and you'll teach him the Art of War. They've likely seen it from the wrong angle, time and time again.

The composition of their units will constantly vary, especially as they continue to vary in modern times, in modern units. A Battalion in the Marine Corps can weigh anywhere from 500 to 1200. Obviously, every attempt is made to inflate that number, but no deployment will be denied due to a lack of men, except for in circumstances of combat ineffectiveness, wherein a unit has most likely just returned from combat (having suffered great losses).

All in all: Organization isn't unavailable to any army with a couple of good engagements under their belt. Far more likely flaws include a lack of decentralized authority, requiring high level management of the slightest action; Lack of initiative instilled during training, causing men to freeze during combat, and leaders to miss opportunities; Heavy handed authority resulting in a massive rise in apathy, or a general will to simply "Get by" without incurring the wrath of leadership...there are many more of these.

Battlefield scavenging is likely to occur except for in units with extremely refined discipline and very reliable supply chains. Even then, the chances of lifting equipment from the dead is fairly likely, given the right circumstances.

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